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It is now manifest that the WTO, the successor to the GATT, will have a new
agenda whose outlines are already clear.1 Among the principal issues will be:
*trade and the environment;
'trade and labour standards; and
'competition policy
While these issues are "universal" , and cut across all nations, the precise nature
of the demands for change in the WTO they have generated and the solutions
which the new leadership of the WTO, yet undecided, must shape, cannot be
understood without realizing that, in essence, the environmental and labour
standards issues are being driven by concerns that create a North-South divide,
using these appellations simply to describe the developed and developing
countries, whereas competition policy has emerged as an issue because
primarily of North-North concerns.
The WTO must now confront the phenomenon of a proliferation of
preferential trading arrangements, regional and non-regional Free Trade Areas,
that characterize the world trading scene. It must seek a new equilibrium between
the WTO and these arrangements, the former embodying nondiscrimination
among trading nations while the latter are inherently preferential and
discriminatory. This is not an issue that member nations are eager to put before
the WTO any time. Yet it speaks to the very core of a free, open, multilateral
trading system, as envisaged at the end of the Second World War and as, in fact,
sought by many of us today; and the new leadership of the WTO must address it
on its own initiative.
1
 In addition to the new agenda, the WTO can expect to be long occupied with the task of
implementing the Uruguay Round accords.
II. The WTO: The Main Agenda
Permit me to begin with the phenomenon of the increased trade and
investment flows, and the opportunities from it that characterise the world
economy and the problems that it is feared to pose to trading nations.
Economists are generally likely to see the increasingly interdependent
world, with its growing exchange of goods and services and flows of funds to
where the returns are expected to be higher, as one that is gaining in prosperity
as it is exploiting the opportunities to trade and to invest that have been
provided by the postwar dismantling of trade barriers and obstacles to
investment flows. This is the conventional "mutual-gain" or "non-zero-sum
game" view of the situation. I would argue that it is also the appropriate one.
1. An Ironic Reversal
It is also a view that many developing countries that were skeptical about,
even hostile to, this benign-impact view of the interaction between themselves
and the world economy at the beginning of the postwar period, and indeed
through much of it, have now embraced. But I must point to an irony: where the
developing countries (the South) were skeptical of the benign-impact view and
the developed countries (the North) were confident of it, today the situation is
the other way around.
(i) The Earlier Situation: Thus, if you look back at the 1950s and 1960s,
the contrast between the developing countries (the South) and the developed
countries (the North) was striking and made the South strongly pessimistic
about the effects of integration into the world economy while the North was
firmly optimistic instead:
4* The South generally subscribed, not to the liberal, mutual-gain, benign-
impact view, but to malign-neglect and even malign-intent views of trade and
investment interactions with the world economy.2 It was feared that "integration
into the world economy would lead to disintegration of the domestic economy".
While the malign-neglect view is manifest most clearly in the famous
dependencia theory that President-elect Cardoso of Brazil formulated in his
radical youth as Latin America's foremost sociologist, the malign-impact view
was most vividly embodied in the the concept and theory of neocolonialism.
Trade thus had to be protected; investment inflows had to be drastically
regulated and curtailed.3 The inward-oriented, import-substituting (IS) strategy
was the order of the day almost everywhere. Only the Far Eastern economies,
starting mainly in the early 1960s, shifted dramatically to an outward-oriented
policy posture: the results, attributable principally to this contrast in orientation
to the world economy but partly also to initial advantages such as inherited land
reforms and high literacy rates, were to produce the most remarkable growth
experiences of this century (and, as I shall presently argue, to facilitate by
example the reversal of the inward-looking policies in recent years). But, at the
time, the developing countries were certainly in an inward, cautious mode about
embracing the world economy.
* By contrast, the developed countries, the North4, moved steadily
forward with dismantling trade barriers through the GATT Rounds, with firm
2
 These different economic-philosophical positions are discussed in depth in Jagdish
Bhagwati (ed.), The New International Economic Order: The North-South Debate. Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1977, Chapter 1.
3
 This attitude extended to other areas too: the outward flow of skilled manpower was thus
considered a "brain drain" rather than an opportunity for one's citizens to train and work abroad
that would lead to a beneficial impact as this diaspora expanded.
4
 They were called the West, of course, then. The changing nomenclature of the poor and
rich countries reflects a shift from a historical, cultural and imperial divide into East and West to a
contemporary, post-colonial and development-related divide into South and North.
5commitment to multilateralism as well, subscribing essentially to the principles
of multilateral free trade and of freer investment flows as the central guiding
principles for a liberal international economic order that would assure economic
prosperity for all participating nations.5
(ii) Role Reversal: The Turnaround: Today, however, the situation is
almost reversed. The fears of integration into the world economy are being
heard, not from the developing countries which see great good from it as they
have extensively undertaken what the GATT calls "autonomous" reductions in
their trade barriers, i.e. unilateral reductions outside the GATT context of
reciprocal reductions. Of course, not all these reductions, and increased
openness to inward DFI, have resulted from changed convictions in favour of
the liberal international economic order and its benefits to oneself, though the
failure of policies based on the old pro-inward-orientation views and the
contrasting success of the Far Eastern countries following the pro-outward-
orientation views have certainly played an important role, especially in Latin
America and Asia. But some measure of the shift must also be ascribed to
necessity resulting from the conditionality imposed by the World Bank and, at
times, by the IMF, as several debt-crisis-afflicted countries flocked to these
institutions for support in the 1980s, and equally from their own perceived need
to restore their external viability by liberal domestic and international policies
designed to reassure and attract DFI.
But if the South has moved to regard integration into the world economy
as an opportunity rather than a peril, it is the North that is now fearful. In
particular, the fear has grown, after the experience with the decline in the real
5
 See, for example, Jagdish Bhagwati, Protectionism, Bertil Ohlin Lectures, Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1988, on the question of free trade, and The World Trading System at Risk. Harry Johnson
Lecture, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991 on the issue of multilateralism.
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wages of the unskilled in the United States and with their employment in
Europe in the 1970s and 1980s, that by trading with the South with its
abundance of unskilled labour, the North will find its own unskilled at risk.6 The
demand for protection that follows is then not the old and defunct "pauper-
labour" argument which asserted falsely that trade between the South and the
North could not be beneficial. Rather, it is the theoretically more defensible,
income-distributional argument that trade with countries with paupers will
produce paupers in our midst, that trade with the poor countries will produce
more poor at home.
Now, it is indeed true that the real wages of the unskilled have fallen
significantly in the United States during the previous two decades. In 1973, the
"real hourly earnings of non-supervisory workers measured in 1982 dollars
...were $8.55. By 1992 they had actually declined to $7.43 — a level that had
been achieved in the late 1960s. Had earnings increased at their eariier pace,
they would have risen by 40 percent to over $12."7 The experience in Europe
has generally been similar in spirit, with the more "inflexible" labour markets
implying that the adverse impact has been on jobs rather than on real wages.8
But the key question is whether the cause of this phenomenon is trade
with the South, as unions and many politicians feel, or rapid modern
information-based technical change that is increasingly substituting unskilled
labour with computers that need skilled rather than unskilled labour. As
always, there is debate among economists about the evidence: but the
6
 The evidence in support of this phenomenon in the 1980s , both for the United States and
for several other countries, is reviewed and synthesized nicely by Marvin Kosters in Chapter 1 of
Jagdish Bhagwati and Marvin Kosters (eds.), Trade and Wages: Leveling Wages Down?.
Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1994.
7
 Cf. Robert Lawrence, "Trade, Multinationals, & Labor", Cambridge: National Bureau of
Economic Research. Working Paper No. 4836, August 1994.
8
 See Employment Outlook Paris: OECD, July 1993.
7preponderant view today among the trade experts is that the evidence for
linking trade with the South to the observed distress among the unskilled to
date is extremely thin, at best. In fact, the main study by labour experts that first
suggested otherwise has been shown to be methodologically unsound in not
appreciating that if real wages were to fall for unskilled labour due to trade with
the South, the goods prices of the unskilled-labour-intensive goods would have
to have fallen;9 and subsequent examination of the US data on prices of goods
shows that the opposite happened to be true!1011
While therefore the consensus currently is that technical change, not
trade with the South, has immiserized our proletariat, the fear still persists that
such trade is a threat to the unskilled. In Europe, there has thus been talk of the
difficulty of competing with "Asiatic ants"; such talk leads to talk of protectionism,
in turn.
Alongside with this is the fear that multinationals will move out to take
advantage of the cheaper labour in the poor countries, as trade becomes freer,
thus adding to the pressure that trade alone, with each nation's capital at home,
9
 See Jagdish Bhagwati, "Free Traders and Free Immigrationists: Strangers or Friends?", New
York: Russell Sage Foundation, Working Paper No. 20, 1991.
10
 This empirical work by Robert Lawrence and Matthew Slaughter is reviewed in Jagdish
Bhagwati and Vivek Dehejia, "Freer Trade and Wages of the Unskilled — Is Marx Striking Again?",
in Bhagwati and Kosters, op.cit. A subsequent empirical study by Jeffrey Sachs and Howard
Schatz, 'Trade and Jobs in US Manufacturing" in Brookinqs Papers. 1994, claims to overturn the
Lawrence-Slaughter findings by taking out computers (a procedure that is debatable at best].
Even then the coefficient with the changed sign is both small and statistically insignificant.So,
while Noam Chomsky has educated us that two negatives add up to a positive in every language, it
is wrong to claim that the two negatives of a statistically insignificant and small parameter of the
required sign add up to a positive support for the thesis that trade has been depressing the real
wages of the unskilled!
" The work of Adrian Wood, North-South Trade. Employment and Inequality. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1994, argues in support of the trade-hurting-real-wages-of-the-unskilled thesis
but his arguments have been effectively criticized by Lawrence, op.cit., 1994. See also the most
recent review of the theory and evidence in Jagdish Bhagwati, 'Trade and Wages: Choosing
Among Alternative Explanations", Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review,
January 1995.
8brings on the real wages of the unskilled. Of course, this too is unsubstantiated
fear: but it has even greater political salience since the loss of jobs to trade is
less easily focused on specific competing countries and their characteristics
than when a factory shuts down and opens in a foreign country instead. As it
happens, I suspect that, at least in the United States, the flow of capital also is
in the wrong direction from the viewpoint of those who are gripped by such fear.
For, during the 1980s, the United States surely received more DFI than it sent
out elsewhere, both absolutely and relative to the 1950s and 1960s. Besides, if
foreign savings are considered instead, the 1980s saw an influx, corresponding
to the current account deficit that has bedevilled US-Japan trade relations for
sure.
2. North-South Issues12:
These fears have intensified acutely, bringing to center stage the
demands that have spread in the US and in Europe for inclusion of
Environmental and Labour Standards in the WTO, requiring that either they be
moved up in the developing countries or else the developed countries should
be allowed to countervail the "implied subsidy" represented by these lower
12
 While I distinguish among "North-South" and "North-North" issues here, let me stress again
that these descriptions are only broadly true, and reflect the principal historical origins of the
issues; the issues are universal and now cut across nations in both groups. Thus, for example,
the demands of eco-dumping duties (which I discuss below) have the potential of creating frictions
among the OECD countries, and not just between them and the countries of the South. Nor
should my use of these short-hand labels lead the audience to conclude that there are coalitions
of the North and of the South to that effect on the issues being discussed. In fact, I was among
the first to discount the enduring effectiveness of a coalition of the South when, in the flush of the
OPEC success, the socalled Global Negotiations were demanded by the G-77 countries at the
United nations: the developing countries got nowhere on these demands. Indeed, they have
been substantially fragmented politically since then, as discussed by me in "Dependence and
Interdependence: Developing Countries in the World Economy", Ernest Sturc Memorial Lecture,
Johns Hopkins University, SAIS, Washington D.C., 1987; reprinted in Jagdish Bhagwati, Political
Economy and International Economics, edited by Douglas Irwin, MIT Press: Cambridge,Mass.,
1991.
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standards. Proposals for such legislation have already been introduced in the
US Congress, as in Congressman Gephardt's socalled "blue" and "green" bill
which would authorize the administration to impose "eco-dumping" duties
against lower Environmental (i.e. green ) standards abroad and "social
dumping" duties against lower Labour (i.e. £>/i/e-coilar workers') standards
abroad.
Several factors contribute to the emergence of these demands. But a
principal one among them surely is the desire to raise, in one way or another,
the costs of production of your rivals abroad: and what is more easy to do than
to say that they are deriving unfair trade advantage by having lower
Environmental and Labour standards? In fact, it is surely easier to get a
sympathetic ear of the politicians if the appeal to them for assistance in shape of
protection or otherwise is couched in terms of, not a simple appeal that one
cannot cope otherwise and wants relief, but the contention instead that one's
distress is the result of one's rivals' perfidious, unfair ways.
(i) Environmental Standards: Why indeed should one object to
differences in different nations' environmental standards in the same industry
(what I call Cross-country Intra-industry, CCII, differences in standards, typically
n shape of pollution tax rates) ? Note that we are talking here about purely
domestic environmental problems: e.g. a country is polluting its own lakes, not
about the environmental problems that arise when one's pollution creates
transborder externalities, as with global warming, ozone layer depletion, and
acid rain (which raise problems about the WTO of a different, and more
compelling, nature).
(a) Indefensible Demands for Eco-dumpinq: In fact, for an economist, the
basic presumption instead is that different countries, even if they accept the
10
same "polluter pay principle", will have legitimate diversity of CCII
environmental taxes/standards for Environmental problems which create purely
domestic pollution.
This diversity will follow from differences in tradeoffs between aggregate
pollution and income at different levels of income, as when richer Americans
prefer to save dolphins from purse-seine nets whereas poorer Mexicans prefer
to put people first and want to raise the productivity of fishing and hence
accelerate the amelioration of Mexican poverty by using such nets. Again,
countries will have natural differences in the priorities attached to which kind of
pollution to attack, arising from differences of historical and other circumstance:
Mexicans will want to worry more about clean water, as dysentery is a greater
problem, than Americans who will want to attach greater priority to spending
pollution dollars on clean air. Differences in technological knowhow and in
endowments can also lead to CCII diversity in pollution tax rates.
The notion therefore that the diversity of CCII pollution standards/taxes is
illegitimate and constitutes "unfair trade" or "unfair competition", to be eliminated
or countervailed by eco-dumping duties, is itself illegitimate. It is incorrect,
indeed illogical, to assert that competing with foreign firms that do not bear
equal pollution-tax burdens is unfair. I would add two more observations:
* We should recognize that if we lose competitive advantage because
we put a larger negative value on a certain kind of pollution whereas others do
not is simply the flip side of the differential valuations. To object to that
implication of the differential valuation is to object to the differential valuation
itself, and hence to our own larger negative valuation. To see this clearly, think
only of a closed economy without trade. If we were to tax pollution by an
industry in such an economy, its implication would be precisely that this industry
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would shrink: it would lose competitive advantage vis-a-vis other industries in
our own country. To object to that shrinking is to object to the negative valuation
being put on the pollution. There is therefore nothing "unfair" from this
perspective, if our industry shrinks because we impose Higher Standards (i.e.
pollution taxes) on our industry while others, who value that pollution less,
choose Lower Standards (i.e. pollution taxes).
* Besides, it is worth noting that that the attribution of competitive
disadvantage to differential pollution tax burdens in the fashion of CCII
comparisons for individual industries confuses absolute with comparative
advantage. Thus, for instance, in a two-industry world, if both industries abroad
have lower pollution tax rates than at home, both will not contract at home.
Rather, the industry with the comparatively higher tax rate will. The noise that
each industry makes on basis of CCII comparisons, aggregated to total noise
by all industries, is then likely to exaggerate seriously the effect of different
environmental valuations and CCII differences on the competitiveness of
industries in Higher-Standards nations.
But one more worry needs to be laid at rest if the demands for upward
harmonization of standards or eco-dumping duties in lieu thereof are to be
effectively dismissed. This is the worry that free trade with countries with Lower
Standards will force down one's Higher Standards. The most potent of these
worries arises from the fear that "capital and jobs" will move to countries with
Lower Standards, triggering a race to the bottom (or more accurately a race
towards the bottom), where countries lower their standards in an inter-
jurisdictional contest, below what some or all would like, in order to attract
12
capital and jobs.13 So, the solution would lie then in coordinating the
standards-setting among the nations engaged in freer trade and investment. In
turn, this may (but is most unlikely to) require harmonization among countries to
the Higher Standards (though, even then, not necessarily at those in place) or
perhaps there might be improvement in welfare from simply setting minimum
floors to the standards.
This is undoubtedly a theoretically valid argument. The key question for
policy, however, is whether the empirical evidence shows, as required by the
argument, that: (1) capital is in fact responsive to the differences in
environmental standards and (2) different countries/jurisdictions actually play
the game then of competitive lowering of standards to attract capital. Without
both these phenomena holding in a significant fashion in reality, the "race to the
bottom" would be a theoretical curiosity.
As it happens, systematic evidence is available for the former proposition
alone, but the finding is that the proposition is not supported by the studies to
date: there is very weak evidence, at best, in favour of interjurisdictional
mobility in response to CCII differences in environmental standards.14 There are
in fact many ways to explain this lack of responsiveness: (1) the differences in
standards may not be significant and are outweighed by other factors that affect
locational decisions; (2) exploiting differences in standards may not be a good
13
 John Wilson, in "Capital Mobility and Environmental Standards: is There a Theoretical Basis
for a Race to the Bottom?", mimeo.,September 1994, a paper prepared for the Ford Foundation
and American Society for International Law project directed by Jagdish Bhagwati and Robert
Hudec, demonstrates that there can even be a "race to the top". This possibility is disregarded in
the analysis above, as in the public discourse.
14
 The evidence has been systematically reviewed and assessed recently by Arik Levinson,
"Environmental Regulations and Industry Location: International and Domestic Evidence",
mimeo., September 1994, University of Wisconsin; forthcoming in the 2-volume set of papers on
Harmonization and Fair Trade: Prerequisites for Free Trade?, edited by Jagdish Bhagwati and
Robert Hudec, 1995, from a research project on the subject, financed by Ford Foundation under
the auspices of the American Society of International Law.
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strategy relative to not exploiting them; and (3) lower standards may
paradoxically even repel, instead of attracting, DFI.15
While we do not have similar evidence on the latter proposition, it is
hardly likely that, as a systematic tendency, countries would be actually
lowering Environmental standards in order to attract capital. As it happens,
countries, and even state governments in federal countries (e.g. President Bill
Clinton, when Governor of Arkansas), typically play the game of attracting
capital to their jurisdictions: but this game is almost universally played, not by
inviting firms to pollute freely but instead through tax breaks and holidays, land
grants at throwaway prices etc., resulting most likely in a "race to the bottom" on
business tax rates which wind up below their optimal levels! It is therefore not
surprising that there is little systematic evidence of governments lowering
Environmental standards in order to attract scarce capital. Contrary to the fears
of the environmental groups, the race to the bottom on Environmental standards
therefore seems to be an unlikely phenomenon in the real world.
I would then conclude that both the "unfair trade" and the "race to the
bottom" arguments for harmonizing CCII standards or else legalizing eco-
dumping duties at the WTO are therefore lacking in rationale: the former is
theoretically illogical and the latter is empirically unsupported. In addition, such
GATT-WTO-legalization of eco-dumping will facilitate protectionism without
doubt. Anti-dumping processes have become the favoured tool of protectionists
today. Is there any doubt that their extension to eco-dumping (and equally to
social-dumping), where the "implied subsidy" through Lower standards must be
inevitably "constructed" by national agencies such as the Environmental
15
 These factors are analyzed in Jagdish Bhagwati and T.N.Srinivasan, "Trade and the
Environment: Does Environmental Diversity Detract from the Case for Free Trade?", July 1994,
appearing in Bhagwati and Hudec, ibid. Their analysis is based on Levinson, op.cit.
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Protection Agency in the same jurisdiction as the complainant industry, will lead
to the same results, even more surely?
The "fixing" of the WTO for environmental issues therefore should not
proceed along the lines of legitimating eco-dumping.16 However, the political
salience of such demands remains a major problem. One may well then ask:
are there any "second-best" approaches, short of the eco-dumping and CCll
harmonization proposals, that may address some of the political concerns at
least economic cost?
(b) A Proposal to Extend Domestic Standards in High Standards
Countries to their Firms in Low Standards Countries, Unilaterally or Preferably
through an OECD Code: The political salience of the harmful demands for eco-
dumping duties and CCll harmonization is greatest when plants are closed by
one's own multinationals and shifted to other countries. The actual shifting of
location, and the associated loss of jobs in that plant, magnify greatly the fear of
the "race to the bottom" and of the "impossibility" of competing against low
standards countries. Similarly, when investment by one's own firms is seen to
go to specific countries which happen to have lower standards, the resentment
gets to be focussed readily against those countries and their standards.
However, when jobs are lost simply because of trade competition, it is much
harder to locate one's resentment and fear on one specific foreign country and
'There are other issues. One main class relates to the current GATT restrictions, as reflected
in recent GATT Panel findings as in the two Dolphin-Tuna cases involving the United States , on
"values"-inspired restrictions on imports of products using processes that are unacceptable,
which will have to be clarified and will be the subject of new negotiations. My own views on the
best solution to this class of problems, as also to the other main class of problems raised by
environmentalists who fear that it is too easy for countries to challenge the Higher Standards
which they have enacted in their own countries (an issue that was at the heart of the latest GATT
Panel finding, mostly in US favour, in the EU-US case on differentially punitive US taxes and
standards on higher-gasoline-useage cars) are developed at length in Bhagwati and Srinivasan,
ibid.; unfortunately, I have no time to address them today.
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its policies as a source of unfair competition.17 Hence, a second-best proposal
could well be to address this particular fear, however unfounded and often
illogical, of outmigration of plants and investment by one's firms abroad to low
standard countries.
The proposal is to adapt the socalled Sullivan Principles approach to the
problem at hand. Under Sullivan, US firms in South Africa were urged to adopt
US practices, not the South African apartheid ways, in their operations. If this
principle that the US firms in Mexico be subject to US environmental policies
(choosing the desired ones from the many that obtain across different states in
this federal country) were adopted by US legislation, that would automatically
remove whatever incentive there was to move because of environmental
burden differences.18
This proposal that one's firms abroad behave as if they were at home-do
in Rome as you do in New York, not as Romans do-can be either legislated
unilaterally by any High Standard country or by a multilateral binding Treaty
among different High Standard countries. Again, it may be reduced to an
exhortation, just as Sullivan Principles were, by single countries in isolation or
by several as through a nonbinding but ethos-defining and policy-encouraging
OECD Code.
The disadvantage of this proposal, of course, is that it does violate the
diversity-is-legitimate rule (whose desirability was discussed by me).
Investment flows, like investment of one's own funds and production and trade
therefrom, should reflect this diversity. It reduces, therefore, the efficiency gains
from a freer flow of cross-country investments today. But if environmental tax
17
 This, of course, does not apply equally to trade in highly differentiated products like autos
where one can get fixated on specific countries, e.g. Japan.
iaSee Bhagwati, "American Rules, Mexican Jobs." The New York Times, March 24, 1993.
16
burden differences are not all that different, or do not figure prominently in firms'
locational decisions, as the empirical literature (that I just cited) seems to stress,
the efficiency costs of this proposal could also be minimal while the gains in
allaying fears and therefore moderating the demand for bad proposals could be
very large indeed.
Yet another objection may focus on intra-OECD differences in High
Standards. Since there are differences among the OECD countries in CCII
environmental tax burdens in specific industries for specific pollution, this
Proposal would lead to "horizontal inequity" among the OECD firms in third
countries. If the British burden is higher than the French, British firms would
face a bigger burden in Mexico than the French firms. But then such differences
already exist among firms abroad since tax practices among the OECD
countries on taxation of firms abroad are not harmonized in many respects.
Interestingly, the problem of horizontal equity has come up in relation also to the
demands of the poor countries (that often find it difficult to enforce import
restrictions effectively) that the domestic restrictions on hazardous products be
automatically extended to exports by every country. That would put firms in the
countries with greater restrictions at an economic disadvantage. But agreement
has now been reached to disregard the problem.
Other problems may arise: (i) monitoring of one's firms in a foreign
country may be difficult; and (ii) the countries with Lower Standards may object
on grounds of "national sovereignty." Neither argument seems compelling. It is
unlikely that a developing country would object to foreign firms doing better by
its citizens in regard to environmental standards (that it itself cannot afford to
impose, given its own priorities, on its own firms). Equally, it would then assist
in monitoring the foreign firms.
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(c) Transborder Externalities: Global Pollution and WTO: The preceding
analysis considered the trade issues which arise between countries even when
the Environmental problems are purely domestic in their scope. They can arise,
of course, even when these problems involve transborder spillovers or
externalities. However, the latter are generally more complex. Let me consider
only the problems that arise when the problem is not just bilateral (as with, say
acid rain, where the US and Canada were involved) or regional, but truly
global.
The chief policy questions concerning trade policy when global pollution
problems are involved instead, as with ozone layer depletion and global
warming, relate to the cooperation-solution-oriented multilateral treaties that are
sought to address them. They are essentially tied into noncompliance
("defection") by members and "free riding" by nonmembers. Because any
action by a member of a treaty relates to targeted actions (such as reducing
CFCs or CO2 emissions) that are a public good (in particular, that the benefits
are nonexcludable, so that if I incur the cost and do something, I cannot exclude
you from benefiting from it), the use of trade sanctions to secure and enforce
compliance automatically turns up on the agenda.
At the same time, the problem is compounded because the agreement
itself has to be legitimate in the eyes of those accused of free riding. Before
those pejorative epithets are applied and punishment prescribed in form of
trade sanctions legitimated at the GATT/WTO, these nations have to be satisfied
that the agreement being pressed on them is efficient and, especially, that it is
equitable in burden-sharing. Otherwise, nothing prevents the politically
powerful (i.e. the rich nations) from devising a treaty that puts an inequitable
burden on the politically weak (i.e. the poor nations) and then using the cloak of
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a "multilateral" agreement and a new GATT/WTO-legitimacy to impose that
burden with the aid of trade sanctions with a clear conscience.
This is why the policy demand, often made, to alter the GATT/WTO to
legitimate trade sanctions on Contracting Parties who remain outside of a treaty,
whenever a plurilateral treaty on a global environmental problem dictates it, is
unlikely to be accepted by the poor nations without safeguards to prevent unjust
impositions. The spokesmen of the poor countries have been more or less
explicit on this issue, with justification. These concerns have been recognized
by the rich nations.
Thus, at the Rio Conference in 1992, the Framework Convention on
Climate Change set explicit goals under which several rich nations agreed to
emission level-reduction targets (returning, more or less, to 1990 levels),
whereas the commitments of the poor countries were contingent on the rich
nations footing the bill.
Ultimately, burden-sharing by different formulas related to past
emissions, current income, current population etc. are inherently arbitrary; they
also distribute burdens without regard to efficiency. Economists will argue for
burden-sharing dictated by cost-minimization across countries, for the earth as
a whole: if Brazilian rain forests must be saved to minimize the cost of a
targeted reduction in CO2 emissions in the world, while the US keeps guzzling
gas because it is too expensive to cut that down, then so be it. But then this
efficient "cooperative" solution must not leave Brazil footing the bill. Efficient
solutions, with compensation and equitable distribution of the gains from the
efficient solution, make economic sense.
A step towards them is the idea of having a market in permits at the world
level: no country may emit CO2 without having bought the necessary permit
19
from a worldwide quota. That would ensure efficiency19 , whereas the
distribution of the proceeds from the sold permits would require a decision
reflecting some multilaterally-agreed ethical or equity criteria (e.g. the proceeds
may be used for refugee resettlement, UN peacekeeping operations, aid
dispensed to poor nations by UNDP, WHO fight against AIDS, etc.). This type of
agreement would have the legitimacy that could then provide the legitimacy in
turn for a GATT/WTO rule that permits the use of trade sanctions against free
riders.
(ii) Labour Standards and the Social Clause
The question of labour standards, and making them into prerequisites for
market access by introducing a Social Clause in the WTO, has both parallels
and contrasts to the environmental questions that I just discussed.
The contrast is that labour standards have nothing equivalent to
transborder environmental externalities. One's labour standards are purely
domestic in scope: in that regard, the demands for "social dumping" for lower
labour standards that parallel the demands for eco-dumping have the same
rationale and hence must be rejected for the same reasons.
But a different aspect to the whole question results from the fact that
labour standards, unlike most environmental standards, are seen in moral
terms. Thus, for example, central to American thinking on the question of the
Social Clause is the notion that competitive advantage can sometimes be
morally "illegitimate". In particular, it is argued that if labour standards
elsewhere are different and unacceptable morally, then the resulting
19
 This efficiency is only in the sense of cost minimization. The number of permits may,
however, be too small or too large, and getting it right by letting nonusers also bid (and then
destroy permits) is bedeviled by free rider problems.
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competition is morally illegitimate and "unfair".
Now, when this argument is made about a practice such as slavery
(defined strictly as the practice of owning and transacting in human beings, as
for centuries before the Abolitionists triumphed), there will be nearly universal
agreement that if slavery produces competitive advantage, that advantage is
illegitimate and ought to be rejected.
Thus, we have here a "values"-related argument for suspending another
country's trading rights or access to our markets, in a sense similar to (but far
more compelling than) the case when the United States sought to suspend
Mexico's tuna-trading rights because of its use of purse-seine nets.20 The
insertion of a Social Clause for Labour Standards into the WTO can then be
seen as a way of legitimating an exception to the perfectly-sensible GATT rule
that prohibits the suspension of a Contracting Party's trading rights concerning
a product simply on the ground that, for reasons of morality asserted by another
Contracting Party, the process by which that product is produced is considered
immoral and therefore illegitimate.
The real problem with the argument, however, is that universally-
condemned practices such as slavery are rare indeed. True, the ILO has many
Conventions that many nations have signed. But many have been signed
simply because in effect they are not binding. Equally, the United States itself
has signed no more than a tiny fraction of these conventions in any case. The
question whether a substantive consensus on anything except wellmeaning
and broad principles without consequences for trade access in case of
noncompliance can be obtained is therefore highly dubious.
talk of the United States suspending Mexico's trade rights since the GATT Panel in the
Dolphin-Tuna case upheld these rights for Mexico. If it had not, I should be talking simply of the
United States denying market access to Mexico.
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Indeed, the reality is that diversity of labour practices and standards is
widespread in practice and reflects, not necessarily venality and wickedness,
but rather diversity of cultural values, economic conditions and analytical beliefs
and theories concerning the economic (and therefore moral) consequences of
specific labour standards. The notion that labour standards can be
universalized, like human rights such as liberty and habeas corpus, simply by
calling them "labour rights" ignores the fact that this easy equation between
culture-specific labour standards and universal human rights will have a difficult
time surviving deeper scrutiny.
Take the United States itself and one sees immediately that its easy
presumption that its labour standards are "advanced" and that it is only
providing "moral leadership" on the question vis-a-vis developing countries, is
hard to sustain and that the US logic on the question can lead the US itself into
a widespread and sustained suspension of its own trading rights if there was an
impartial tribunal and standing to file compliants was given to concerned
citizens and NGOs rather than to governments that would be intimidated by the
power of the United States from taking it to court.
Thus, for instance, worker participation in decisionmaking on the plant, a
measure of true economic democracy much more pertinent than the
unionization of labour, is far more widespread in Europe than in North America:
would we then condemn North America to denial of trading rights by the
Europeans? Migrant labour is ill-treated to the level of brutality and slavery in
US agriculture due to grossly inadequate and corrupt enforcement, if
investigative television shows on CNN and CBS's 60 Minutes programme are a
guide; does this mean that other nations should prohibit the import of US
agricultural products? Sweatshops exploiting female immigrants in textiles with
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long hours and below-minimum wages are endemic in the textile industry, as
documented amply by several civil-liberties groups: should the right of the US to
export textiles then not be suspended by other countries as much as the United
States seeks to suspend the imports of textiles made by exploited child labour?
Even the right to organize trade unions may be considered to be inadequate in
the US if we go by "results", as the US favors in judging Japan: less than 15% of
the US labour force in the private sector today is unionized. Indeed, it is no
secret, except to those who prefer to think that labour standards are inadequate
only in developing countries, that unions are actively discouraged in several
ways in the United States. Strikes are also circumscribed. Indeed, in essential
industries they are restricted: but the definition of such industries also reflects
economic structure and political realities, making each country's definition only
culture-specific and hence open to objection by others. Should other countries
have then suspended US flights because President Reagan had broken the Air
Traffic Controllers' strike?
Lest you think that the question of child labour is an easy one, let me
remind you that even this raises complex questions as indeed recognized by
the ILO, though not in many of the arguments heard in the United States today.
The use of child labour, as such, is surely not the issue. Few children grow up
even in the US without working as babysitters or delivering newspapers; many
are even paid by parents for housework in the home. The pertinent social
question, familiar to anyone with even a nodding acquaintance with Chadwick,
Engels and Dickens and the appalling conditions afflicting children at work in
England's factories in the early Industrial Revolution, is rather whether children
at work are protected from hazardous and oppressive working conditions.
Whether child labour should be altogether prohibited in a poor country is
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a matter on which views legitimately differ. Many feel that children's work is
unavoidable in the face of poverty and that the alternative to it is starvation
which is a greater calamity, and that eliminating child labour would then be like
voting to eliminate abortion without worrying about the needs of the children
that are then born.
Then again, insisting on the "positive-rights"-related right to unionize to
demand higher wages, for instance, as against the "negative-rights"-related
right of freedom to associate for political activity, for example, can also be
morally obtuse. In practice, such a right could imply higher wages for the
"insiders" who have jobs, at the expense of the unemployed "outsiders".
Besides, the unions in developing countries with large populations and much
poverty are likely to be in the urban-industrial activities, with the industrial
proletariat among the better-off sections of the population, whereas the real
poverty is among the nonunionized landless labour. Raising the wages of the
former will generally hurt, in the opinion of many developing-country
economists, the prospects of rapid accumulation and growth which alone can
pull more of the landless labour eventually into gainful employment. If so, the
imposition of the culture-specific developed-country-union views on poor
countries about the rights of unions to push for higher wages will resolve
current-equity and intergenerational-equity problems in ways that are morally
unacceptable to these countries, and correctly so.
One is then led to conclude that the idea of the Social Clause in the WTO
is rooted generally in an ill-considered rejection of the general legitimacy of
diversity of labour standards and practices across countries. The alleged claim
for the universality of labour standards is (except for a rare few cases such as
slavery) generally unpersuasive.
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The developing countries cannot then be blamed for worrying that the
recent escalation of support for such a Clause in the WTO in major OECD
countries derives instead from the desire of labour unions to protect their jobs
by protecting the industries that face competition from the poor countries. They
fear that moral arguments are produced to justify restrictions on such trade
since they are so effective in the public domain. In short, the "white man's
burden" is being exploited to secure the "white man's gain". Or, to use another
metaphor, "blue protectionism" is breaking out, masking behind a moral face.
Indeed, this fearful conclusion is reinforced by the fact that none of the
major OECD countries pushing for such a Social Clause expect to be the
defendants, instead of the plaintiffs, in Social-Clause-generated trade-access
cases. On the one hand, the standards (such as prohibition of child labour) to
be included in the Social Clause to date are invariably presented as those that
the developing countries are guilty of violating, when some transgressions
thereof are to be found in the developed countries themselves. Thus, according
to a report in The Financial Times, a standard example used by the labour
movement to garner support for better safety standards is a disastrous fire in a
factory in Thailand where many died because exits were shut and unusable.
Yet, when I read this report, I recalled an example just like this (but far more
disconcerting when you noted that the fatalities occurred in the richest country
in the world) about a Tyson Foods chicken plant in Arkansas, I believe under
Governor Clinton's watch. Yet, the focus was on the poor, not the rich, country!
On the other hand, the choice of standards chosen for attention and sanctions at
the WTO is also clearly biased against the poor countries in the sense that
none of the problems where many of the developed countries would be found in
significant violation —such as worker participation in management, union
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rights, rights of migrants and immigrants — are meant to be included in the
Social Clause. The stones are to be thrown at the poor countries' glass houses
by rich countries that build fortresses around their own. Symmetry of obligations
simply does not exist in the Social Clause, as contemplated currently, in terms
of the coverage of the standards.
In fact, as I argued at the outset, the salience which the Social Clause
crusade has acquired in the US and Europe, and its specific contents, owe
much to the widespread fear, evident during the NAFTA debate in the United
States, that trade with the poor countries (with abundant unskilled labour) will
produce unemployment and reductions in the real rages of the unskilled in the
rich countries. The Social Clause is, in this perspective, a way in which the
fearful unions seek to raise the costs of production in the poor countries as free
trade with them threatens their jobs and wages.
If not Social Clause, What Else? If this analysis is correct, then the idea
of a Social Clause in the WTO is not appealing; and the developing countries'
opposition to its enactment is justified. We would not be justified then in
condemning their objections and unwillingness to go along with our demands
as depravity and "rejectionism".
But if a Social Clause does not make good sense, is everything lost for
those in both developed and developing countries who genuinely wish to
advance their own views of what are "good" labour standards? Evidently not.
It is surely open to them to use other instrumentalities such as
nongovernmental organization (NGO)-led educational activities to secure a
consensus in favour of their positions. In fact, if your ideas are good, they
should spread without coercion. The Spanish Inquisition should not be
necessary to spread Christianity; indeed, the Pope has no troops. Mahatma
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Gandhi's splendid idea of nonviolent agitation spread, and was picked up by
Martin Luther King, not because he worked on the Indian government to
threaten retribution against others otherwise; it happened to be just morally
compelling.
I would add that one also has the possibility of recourse to private
boycotts, available under national and international law; they are an
occasionally-effective instrument. They constitute a well-recognized method of
protest and consensus-creation in favour of one's moral positions.
With the assistance of such methods of suasion, a multilateral consensus
must be achieved on the moral and economic legitimacy of a carefully-defined
labour standard (and formally agreed to at the ILO today in light of modern
thinking in economics and of the accumulated experience of developmental
and labour issues to date, and with the clear understanding that we are not just
passing resolutions but that serious consequences may follow for follow-
through by the signatory nations). The ILO is clearly the institution that is best
equipped to create such a consensus, not the GATT/WTO, just as multilateral
trade negotiations are conducted at the GATT, not at the ILO.
In turn, the annual ILO monitoring of compliance with ILO conventions is
an impartial and multilateral process, undertaken with the aid of eminent jurists
across the world. Such a process, with changes for standing and for
transparency, should be the appropriate forum for the annual review of
compliance by nation states of such newly-clarified and multilaterally-agreed
standards. Such monitoring, the opprobrium of public exposure, and the
effective strengthening therewith of NGOs in the offending countries (many of
which are now democratic and permissive of NGO activity) will often be large
enough forces to prod these countries into corrective action.
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In extraordinary cases where the violations are such that the moral sense
of the world community is outraged, the existing international processes are
available to undertake even coercive, corrective multilateral sanctions against
specific countries and to suspend their entire trading rights.
Thus, for instance, under UN embargo procedures, which take
precedence over GATT and other treaties, South Africa's GATT membership
proved no barrier to the embargo against it precisely because the world was
virtually united in its opposition to apartheid. Even outside of the UN, the GATT
waiver procedure has permitted 2/3rds of the Contracting Parties to suspend
any GATT member's trading rights, altogether or for specific goods (and now,
services).
I must add one final thought to assure those who feel that their own moral
view must be respected at any cost, even if others cannot be persuaded to see
things that way. Even they need not worry under current international
procedures. Thus, suppose that (say) American or French public opinion on an
issue (as in the Tuna-Dolphin case for the former and the Beef-Hormone case
for the latter) forces the government to undertake a unilateral suspension of
another GATT member's trading rights. There is nothing in the GATT, nor will
there be anything in the WTO, which will then compel the overturning of such
unilateral action. The offending Contracting Party (i.e. the one undertaking the
unilateral action) can persist in a violation while making a compensatory offer of
an alternative trade concession or the offended Party can retaliate by
withdrawing an equivalent trade concession. Thus, unless one resents having
to pay for one's virtue (since the claim is that "our labour standard is morally
superior"), this is a perfectly sensible solution even to politically-unavoidable
unilateralism: do not import glass bangles made with child labour in Pakistan or
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India, but make some other compensatory trade concession. And remember
that the grant of an alternative trade concession (or tariff retaliation) makes
some other activity than the offending one more attractive, thus helping one to
shrink the offending activity: that surely should be a matter for approbation
rather than knee-jerk dismissal.
3. North-North Issues
So far, I have discussed issues that touch primarily on the North-South
questions as they are emerging in the new world economy of freer trade and
investment, cautioning against the proposals to modify the WTO to sanction and
legitimate eco-dumping, social dumping and the inclusion of a Social Clause in
the WTO.
But the enhanced integration of the world economy, and the sensitivity to
"unfair trade" of all varieties, have prompted increased friction and demands for
harmonization of policies among the developed countries as well.
Competition Policy: The principal area in which demands for such
(predominantly) North-North harmonization are emerging is competition policy.
I need hardly remind a Japanese audience that the main impetus behind the
emergence of this demand has been the suspicion that the keiretsu and the
retail distribution systems of Japan lead to impaired market access, in effect
"nullifying and impairing" the value of Japan's trade concessions.
It is important to observe that these problems are not endemic only to
Japan. For example, we have recently been reminded that the EU also
provides exemption from its competition directives to its auto industry so as to
permit exclusive dealerships and has just renewed it. Besides, the keiretsu
system is now widely recognized to be an efficient system and its side-effects on
market access may be no more than those accruing from the vertical integration
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that is more widely practiced in the United States and works against outside
suppliers more directly.
The WTO will have to move in the direction of bringing these questions
into its purview fairly soon as they are now beginning to prompt unilateral
approaches and solutions.
My view is that, while we do this, it is possible even under current GATT
rules to use Article XXIII i(b) on nonviolation to bring competition-policy-related
questions before the GATT and to develop jurisprudence that will reflect some
minimal "norms" that are commonly shared, while serving to soothe the tensions
that unilateral actions bring and simultaneously advancing the important
principle that impartial rules must be deployed so as to apply symmetrically to
all Contracting Parties instead of being invoked arbitrarily and only against
others.
IV. Regionalism versus Multilateralism or FT As versus FT.
But if the matters above are broadly characterized as North-South and
North-North issues, the one overriding phenomenon in the world economy
today is that of the proliferation of inherently-preferential Free Trade Areas and
hence the issue of how we view them: do they detract from, or add to,
multilateral free trade; or, as I remarked several years ago21 , are they building
blocks or stumbling blocs to the ultimate goal of a world trading system ensuring
freer trade to all?
In my view, there are only two compelling arguments for giving up the
nondiscrimination implied in all-embracing multilateralism in trade:
* That a smaller group of countries ants to develop a Common Market in
21
 Cf. Jagdish Bhagwati, The World Trading System at Risk, 1991, ofi.cit.
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this case, not just trade, but also investment and migration barriers are
eventually eliminated just as in a federal state and the full economic and
political advantages of such integration follow; and
* That it is not possible to move to fully multilateral free trade (FT) for all
through multilateral trade negotiations (MTN), at the GATT or now WTO, so that
the only feasible way to continue reducing trade barriers is to go down the route
of open-ended, easy-to-join preferential free trade areas (FTAs) among as
many willing nations as you can find.
The former argument underlay the European initiative for the Common
Market. The latter argument provided a key motivation for the United States, a
keen opponent of preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) and an avid
supporter of multilateralism throughout the postwar period, to shift course and
to embrace PTAs by initiating the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA)
in 1983. The failure to secure agreement from Europe and the developing
countries to start a new Round of MTN at the GATT Ministerial in November
1982 led Ambassador William Brock to this approach; and the intention then
was certainly to use an ever-expanding set of FTAs, with the US acting as both
catalyst and nucleus, to achieve the worldwide free trade that could not be
reached via the GATT any more.
With Secretary James Baker, this open-ended approach, where the US-
centered FTAs would be open to any nation anywhere — they were informally
discussed with Egypt and ASEAN nations at the time ---, became captured by
the proponents of "regionalism" who linked it instead, and constrained it, to the
Americas, as part of President Bush's Initiative for the Americas. Thus grew the
fears that the world was dividing into 3 blocs: the EU, the Americas, and
possibly a Japan-centered Asian bloc.
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In the event, the US expanded CUFTA to NAFTA, and is now poised to
go down the FTA route more energetically, promising to take Chile and then
other South American nations on board. While the idea of regionalism is not
dead, the Washington policymakers, in response to criticisms including mine22 ,
have occasionally expressed the view that the earlier open-ended nonregional
FTAs approach will be adopted instead. Thus, President Bush, in a major
speech in Detroit at the end of the Presidential campaign, promised that he
would extend NAFTA to Eastern European nations and to the Far East. And
recently, the Clinton administration has tentatively explored the possibility of
extending NAFTA to South Korea and Singapore.
But we must ask: is this infatuation with FTAs, including the pressure
alleged to be exerted by the United States to move APEC in the direction of an
FTA, desirable when the multilateral trading system has already been
jumpstarted with the impending ratification of the Uruguay Round and the birth
of the WTO? Would it not be wiser for the world's only remaining superpower,
and currently also its most robust economy, to take again the leadership role on
multilateral free trade and to focus on converting NAFTA into a Common Market
instead of seeking to extend it to more members and, given the inherently-
preferential nature of such free FTAs, spreading what can be properly
considered to be a stain on the now-realistic vision of a nondiscriminatory
world trading system?
This question becomes compelling as soon as one realises that FTAs are
preferential, discriminatory trading arrangements. It is time that we admitted that
22
 Cf. Jagdish Bhagwati, "'President Clinton's Trading Choices: Beyond NAFTA What?",
Foreign Policy. Summer 1993. I advocated there the position taken above that the best course
was to return now to multilateralism and to give up on further FTAs. But that, if FTAs were to be
pursued, then nonregional FTAs were better than regional ones because, among other reasons,
the regional approach would be more likely to promote fragmentation of the world economy into
preferential blocs.
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the phrase Free Trade Areas is Orwellian newspeak. It lulls us, indeed
editorialists and columnists and politicians as well, into focusing only on the fact
that trade barriers are lowered for members to the exclusion of the fact that,
implicitly, the barriers are raised (relatively) for nonmembers. FTAs are therefore
two-faced: they embody both free trade and protection. The reason is that they
are inherently preferential and discriminatory. Perhaps, as economists
interested in the quality of public policy discourse, we should take a pledge to
rename the FTAs henceforth as PTAs (i.e. preferential trade areas).
In that regard, let me say also that, during the lobbying campaign for
NAFTA — I should really call it NAPTA if I was to act on my suggestion above
an incompetently drafted statement of support for NAFTA made the rounds for
our signatures. It was notable for its implied equation of the case for the
proposed FTA with the case for free trade, obfuscating the real issues23 . I was
not asked to sign it and so the absence of my signature was not indicative of my
views. [In fact, the media, in writing on NAFTA, occasionally described me as a
notable signatory, assuming that I must have signed since I was a "free trader"
or, as an irate administration economist of great distinction who was upset with
my views and writings on Japan once denounced me, a "hyper-free trader".] I
23
 The debasement of the economic discourse from the opposite viewpoint comes, on the
other hand, from the occasional suggestion that, to join FTAs, countries need to satisfy prior
conditions on macro-stability et.al. Thus, in a recent study, the wellknown economists Gary
Hufbauer and Jeff Schott of the Institute of International Economics in Washington appear to list
several criteria for countries to be invited to join NAFTA, assigning weighted grades for this
purpose. This leaves me puzzled, if I have understood them correctly. Free Trade requires no
such preconditions, so why should FTAs? If it is correct to impose such prior conditions for us to
let them join us in freeing trade within an FTA, then we would have to revise all our textbooks and
treatises on international economics which argue that, no matter what other countries' own
policies, we will generally profit from freeing trade in a nondiscriminatory fashion. [The only
difference would arise from the discriminatory nature of FTAs: we may be hurt by a trade-diverting
FTA, in which case the FTA may be regarded as undesirable but the focus then is not on our
potential FTA partner fulfilling prior preconditions but we ourselves doing so.] The Hufbauer-
Schott type of thinking is thus not merely incorrect, insofar as (let me repeat) I understand it
correctly. It could also be harmful if it spread from FTAs to thinking about Free Trade generally
among policy circles.
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have little doubt that many economists signed the ill-tutored statement of
support for NAFTA simply because, once the protectionist Ross Perot had
staked out his opposition to NAFTA, there seemed to be only a binary choice
much like the choice from two tasteless entrees in a restaurant: support
protectionism or support NAFTA. Signing the imperfect statement in support of
NAFTA must have seemed the lesser of two bad choices, quite obviously.
Now that Ross Perot is out of the way, NAFTA has passed, and the
Clinton administration is embarked on extending NAFTA into new countries
starting with Chile and is understood also to be desirous of turning APEC into
an FTA, it is surely time to subject this pro-FTA policy to fierce scrutiny.24 Such
scrutiny, in my view, would expose this policy of the administration as a folly.25
For, in essence, the proliferation of such PTAs, where countries extend
preferences in different trading arrangements, creates a "spaghetti bowl"
phenomenon. Thus, the EU has different types of association agreements with
countries outside of the core members; the US has hub-and-spoke
arrangements with free trade with Israel which, in turn, is not a partner of
NAFTA; Israel has arrangements with EU and US; Mexico is a member of
NAFTA and of an aspiring APEC FTA; Mercosur is about to enter into
negotiations for a preferential trading arrangement with the EU, and so on. As
24
 The Economist, in a brilliant lead editorial in the end-of-the-year Double Issue, December
24th- January 6th, entitled "Battle Lines", raised much the same issue, asking for an examination
of the "increasing enthusiasm for regional, as opposed to global, agreements to liberalize trade"
and avoiding "the mistake of unreservedly supporting everything Ross Perot attacks". I
congratulate this magazine which, along with The Financial Times, has played a distinguished and
impressive role in raising the key analytical issues in regard to the world trading system in the last
half a decade, while the US business magazines have done little except to play to nationalist and
lobbying business viewpoints on issues such as NAFTA and Japan-bashing.
25
 For a fuller analysis, see also my 1994 Wincott Lecture in London, to be published by the
Institute of Economic Affairs and my Keynote Address in Tokyo in October 1994 at the
Symposium organized by Nihon Keizai Shimbun and the Ministry of External Affairs in celebration
of the 30th Anniversary of Japan's accession to the OECD.
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countries reach out for special deals, not just among developing countries (as
they have done for decades) but with the major trading nations as well, the
analogy with an orgy, with bodies intertwined and reaching out in different
directions, may be more apt in the increasingly salacious Washington.
The Spaghetti Bowl: Problems with Preferential Trading Arrangements
Such spaghetti-bowl proliferation of preferential trading arrangements
clutters up trade with discrimination depending on the "nationality" of a good.,
with inevitable costs that trade experts have long noted. In particular, consider
the following points, some relevant only to Free Trade Areas, the others more
general.
(i) Rules of origin, which are inherently arbitrary despite the Codifications
we must live with, multiply under Free Trade Areas because different members
have different external tariffs, making the occupation of lobbyists (who seek to
protect by fiddling with the adoption of these rules and then with the estimates
that underlie the application of these rules, as in the recent Canadian Honda
case) and of customs officers (who can make much money by assigning goods
to different origins as suggested by those fetching gifts) immensely profitable at
our expense. Anne Krueger and Kala Krishna have written extensively and
illuminatingly on this problem; so has the distinguished lawyer-cum-trade-
commentator, David Palmeter.
(ii) More generally, it is increasingly arbitrary and nonsensical to operate
trade policy of all kinds on the assumption that you can identify which product is
whose. When i was a student at Oxford in the 1950s, there used to be a Who's
Whose, designed to list the bondings (or "steady relationships" in our slang)
among the undergraduates. Needless to say, the sexual revolution and the rise
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of uninhibited promiscuity put an end to it. Similarly, with the phenomenal
globalization of investment and production, a Who's Whose in defining trade
policy is an increasing anomaly, tying up trade policy in knots and absurdities
and facilitating protectionist capture.
Take some telling examples. We have tried assiduously to tell the
Japanese that exports from their transplants in the US to Japan are not to be
counted as US exports. On the other hand, when the Europeans tried to include
the cars exported from these very transplants in their VER quotas on Japanese
cars, Mrs. Carla Hills was up in arms! Again, just because imports from Japan
are sought to be controlled, rather than imports from all sources without
discrimination (as would be the case simply with a tariff or an auctioned VER),
we have the EU getting into knots about whether Japanese transplants in UK
are to be allowed freedom of access within the EU, and when would a car
produced in Oxfordshire be British rather than Japanese.
Indeed, as the world economy increasingly muddies up the idealized
picture of Japanese, American, British, Indian and Mexican goods that drives
much of trade policy including particularly the pursuit of Free Trade Areas, the
more we trade economists can see the wisdom of the great trade theorists of the
past, Viner, Meade et.al., who were strongly wedded to nondiscrimination and
hence to MFN and multilateralism. As usual, a quote from Keynes, who had
renounced his earlier skepticism of nondiscrimination during the British-
American discussions of the design of the postwar Bretton Woods institutions,
from his speech in the House of Lords in 1945, says it best:
" [The proposed policies] aim, above all, at the restoration of multilateral
trade... the bias of the policies before you is against bilateral barter and every
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kind of discriminatory practice. The separate blocs and all the friction and loss of
friendship they must bring with them are expedients to which one may be driven
in a hostile world where trade has ceased over wide areas to be cooperative
and peaceful and where are forgotten the healthy rules of mutual advantage
and of equal treatment. But it is surely crazy to prefer that ."a
(iii) Again, it is frequently claimed that trade creation will be the order of
the day with FTAs and customs unions (CUs); hence we need not fear trade
diversion. But, as I noted some years ago, when protection is administered (in
the form of VERs, anti-dumping actions etc.), it is selective and variable. The
endogeneity of such protection means that trade creation can turn into trade
diversion. Thus, if the US crowds Mexico in an industry, potentially creating
trade in the Vinerian sense, Mexico can, and probably will, start anti-dumping
action against nonmember suppliers and seek to accommodate thus both its
own and the US firms at the expense of nonmember suppliers, transmuting
trade creation into trade diversion.
At my suggestion a few years ago when I was Economic Policy Adviser to
the Director General of the GATT and we were planning an Annual Report on
Regionalism, Brian Hindley of LSE and Patrick Messerlin of Paris investigated
this possibility empirically to see if the well-documented anti-dumping actions
(especially against Japan and the Far East) of the EC could be so interpreted as
responses to the internal "trade-creating" competitive pressures rather than to
exogenous intensification of competition from abroad. Their verdict was: yes,
"Quoted (p.64) in The World Trading System at Risk. Princeton University Press: Princeton,
1991, based on the Harry Johnson Lecture that I delivered in July 1990. Italics have been
inserted.
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there is evidence in some cases that this had happened.27
The NAFTA's economist supporters, many untutored in any of these
nuances because few had any professional competence in the complexities of
trade analysis and realities, simply missed this important issue, focusing at best
only on the observed trade barriers. When you combine this observation with
the fact that our negotiators helped to weaken the improvement in discipline on
anti-dumping at the Uruguay Round, as I observed above, the folly of our trade
policy becomes obvious. Indeed, if you want to go down the PTA route, and to
minimize the possibility of trade diversion, be sure that there is far more (not
less) discipline on administered protection than we currently have!28
(iv) In regard to trade diversion, furthermore, Arvind Panagariya of the
University of Maryland, a distinguished trade theorist and policy analyst, has
raised the question: would not Mexico, and potential future developing
countries of South America seeking to join NAFTA, themselves suffer from
harmful trade diversion from joining NAFTA? Arguing that the US and Canada
are largely open, and comparing with the alternative of nondiscriminatory trade
liberalization, Panagariya has argued that trade diversion is indeed what
Mexico et.al. face, with the US and Canada gaining from the preferential trade
27
 The Hindley-Messerlin paper has now appeared in a volume edited by Kym Anderson and
Richard Blackhurst for the GATT and published by Harvester Wheatsheaf (UK), 1994.
28
 Of course, trade diversion itself may be the principal driving force behind the choice of FTAs
rather than nondiscriminatory trade liberalization as far as business lobbying is concerned. This
"incentive" or "political economy" aspect of FTAs versus FT has been raised by me in
"Regionalism versus Multilateralism: An Overview", published in 1994 in the World Bank volume
on the subject, edited by Panagariya and de Melo. It was also the subject of an Economics Focus
column in 1993 in The Economist. That business lobbies, interested in exports, may prefer to go
for preferential trade barrier reductions in their favour rather than investing efforts in opening
markets for their rivals as well is what I have long been stressing, noting the differential lobbying in
favour of NAFTA as against the Uruguay Round and the GATT. This idea has been analytically
pursued in recent theoretical papers by my Columbia University student Pravin Krishna and by
Arvind Panagariya and Ronald Findlay, the latter forthcoming in Gene Grossman and Robert
Feenstra (ed.), The Political Economy of Trade Reform, Essays in Honor of Bhagwati, MIT Press:
Cambridge, Mass., 1995.
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liberalization of Mexico et.al. and the latter losing from it.29
One may well object: why should Mexico et.al. then want to join NAFTA?
If the question is raised because it is inconceivable that the governments of
these countries would not be rational in their policy choices, then that
assumption itself must be clearly rejected. For one thing, as we know well from
aid experience and literature, one can seek something which sounds good but
actually does harm. Besides, the objectives of the leaders may be diversified.
Thus, for instance, they may expect to gain political kudos by going along with
NAFTA because, by granting preferential access to the US exporting interests,
and through the implied underlining of Mexico's special relationship to the US,
they may gain the support of the US in reaching out for prizes in a variety of
unrelated political arenas. Thus, for example, in the absence of NAFTA and the
willingness of President Salinas to put almost everything on the line for its
passage, can one seriously imagine that the US would have gotten Mexico into
the OECD30 or backed President Salinas for the important job of the Director
General of the WTO31 ?
(v) Perhaps the most frequently-repeated "non-economic" argument on
29
 Panagariya actually makes a persuasive case that Mexico et.al. are most likely to suffer a
welfare loss even if the comparison is with the initial situation rather than with unilateral trade
liberalization by them. In the latter case, the loss by Mexico et.al. is certain, of course, since US
and Canada are assumed to be open in all situations being compared. Cf. Panagariya, "The Free
Trade Area of the Americas: Good for Latin America?", University of Maryland, mimeo.. 1994.
30
 One may wittily remark that Mexico's undistinguished, low growth rate (by the standards of
most developing countries) during the 1980s qualifies it as an OECD country ! Seriously,
however, it is wellknown that Mexico got in because the US wanted this badly: as one of the
highest officials of the OECD told me in private conversation, "Secretary Lloyd Bentsen [a major
supporter of NAFTA] was very keen on it".
31
 Remember that Mexico got into the GATT only in 1985, nor is it exceptional among the
leading developing countries in terms of income level, sustained and high growth rates, effective
assault on poverty, level of industrialization, degree of scientific achievement, and other indices
that normally command one's attention. None of this, of course, is to detract from the significant
accomplishments of the young Mexican leaders and technocrats, including Finance Minister
Pedro Aspe, Trade Minister Jaime Serra and others in the splendid Salinas team, in moving
Mexico through difficult political and economic reforms.
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behalf of Mexico et.al. joining a preferential trade arrangement such as the
NAFTA has been that it helps to "lock in the reforms", giving them credibility. But
if this means locking in trade liberalization, I have argued that acceptance of
GATT bindings can equally lock in the liberalization. Besides, it is as difficult for
a small power like Mexico to get out of GATT obligations as it is to leave NAFTA
once you are in.
As regards NAFTA giving credibility to Mexico's reforms, the recent crisis
in Mexico lays that claim to rest just about as well as could be done. Real
credibility in your reforms can come only from the credibility of your economic
policies, not from an external pact like NAFTA, just as the announced
commitment to a fixed exchange rate carries no credibility if the underlying
macroeconomic policies are not themselves credible: it is the latter that give
credibility to the announced fixed exchange rate, not the other way around!
Thus, it is obvious that NAFTA has done little or nothing to establish the
credibility of Mexico's reforms at home or abroad; claims that it would and did
were simply so much hype that, repeated long enough by NAFTA proponents,
came to be accepted as incontrovertible truth by many.
I therefore find it difficult to be enthusiastic about the US pursuing FT As,
with all these drawbacks, when the WTO is already jumpstarted and therefore
the second of the two arguments cited earlier in support of FT As is lacking in
force today. However, it has been asserted, in defense of pursuing FTAs
despite the preferential nature of FTAs and the success of the WTO, that there is
a benign, symbiotic relationship between FTAs and the multilateral system, and
that the former is a faster process and, in turn, speeds up the process of
dismantling trade barriers and making progress generally at the WTO.
Superficially, this scenario sounds plausible. But, on closer examination, it is
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seen to be an untenable view.
In particular, consider the popular argument that FT As, at least where led
by the United States, will be of the "open regionalism" variety so that, with
steadily increasing members, we will arrive at full multilateralism. As
proponents of this view put it, "you get two members and the third will want to be
in", and then the fourth and, to draw on Agatha Christie, "then there will be all" in
the FTA, arriving effectively at worldwide free trade just as we multilateralists
want. By contrast, and by implication, the WTO cannot lead to effective and
speedy liberalization on its own: it is too unwieldy.
But this contention is naive for several reasons. Take the question of
speed. FT As are at least as hard to negotiate as multilateral trade treaties like
the Uruguay Round. After a decade, there are three countries in NAFTA; by
contrast, the Uruguay Round took over seven years to negotiate, with over 115
nations and negotiations over a large range of old and new issues.
To argue that NAFTA expedited or smoothed the way for the conclusion
of the Round would be equally silly, though it is often done. Thus, President
Clinton's success with NAFTA is supposed to have helped him with his passage
of the Round through the Congress. True, President Clinton found his free-
trade voice on NAFTA; but why should we assume that he would not have found
it on the Round if it was the only game in town?
Also, remember the immense political divisions (far greater than over the
Uruguay Round) that arose over NAFTA. The proximity of Mexico, and the fear
that trade would only intensify the adverse effect that the much-noticed and
feared Mexican illegal immigration was exerting on real wages of the unskilled
in the United States, wound up making the freeing of trade with the poor
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countries a fiercely controversial issue.32 It is hard to imagine that, with so
many issues and so many countries involved in the Round and hence diffusion
of focus instead of the exclusive focus on one particular country feared by the
unions and the workers as a palpable threat to their living standards, the politics
would have been as difficult on the Round by itself. The baggage of the NAFTA
fight was thus hurtful (in giving remarkable political salience to an issue that
was almost created in the NAFTA crucible) to the cause of multilateral free trade
extended to developing countries generally, and hence to the passage of the
Uruguay Round and to the future functioning of the WTO (where issues such as
the Social Clause have also therefore gained more credibility), not helpful.
NAFTA's passage also was subject to Mexico's acceptance of the
Supplemental Agreements on environmental and labour standards. But, as
Anne Krueger and I have already argued, this is exactly the wrong way to go:
why should such agreements be a precondition for freer trade? These
demands could have been successfully resisted, as they are so far, at the GATT,
whereas Salinas caved in simply because this was a superpower bargaining in
a one-on-one format with a vastly inferior power. In turn, this has strengthened
the environmental and labour lobbies into arguing that because NAFTA did it,
so must the WTO, and the Clinton administration has not been able to stand up
to these demands. In short, the NAFTA has made the WTO's business more
32
 Free trade and free immigration are indirect and direct ways, respectively, in which a poor
country with abundant unskilled labour could reduce the real wages of our unskilled labour. This
has long been understood, both in the theoretical literature on trade and on immigration, and was
also implicit in the great debate in Britain prior to the enactment of the 1905 national legislation
restricting immigration: at the time, free traders were also free immigrationists and free immigration
was often called "free trade in paupers". For a detailed analysis and documentation of these
questions, see my "Free Traders and Free Immigrationist: Friends or Strangers?", Russell Sage
Foundation, New York, 1991. It was thus perfectly plausible to me that, during the NAFTA debate
when the administration and Salinas kept talking about how NAFTA would reduce illegal
immigration, the response of many was contemptuously dismissive: according to them, we




In fact, I have argued that these and other lobbies cannot have escaped
the conclusion that the smart way to go is through US-centered FTAs rather
than through the WTO, since you can first get Mexico to buckle under to these
demands, then tell Chile and others: this is how NAFTA is, so you must accept
these "nontrade" terms and conditions if you wish to come on board. Of course,
this strategy works so much better than trying to impose these extraneous,
indeed harmful, conditions through multilateral trade negotiations where all
these countries are together and have more bargaining power! So much then
for the idea of "open regionalism" or Ambassador Brock's idea of rapidly
expanding open-ended FTAs. Yes, if you agree to several extraneous,
essentially trade-unrelated "side payments" (to use the terminology of John
Whalley in his work on CUFTA) or "conditions" which have nothing to do with
trade liberalization, you can qualify to join, not otherwise! It is like saying: my
bridge club is open to everyone provided they wear mustaches, smoke pipes,
wear ties and shine their shoes. This is openness indeed!
In fact, then, FTAs have become a process by which a hegemonic power
seeks to (and often manages to) satisfy its multiple nontrade demands on other,
weaker trading nations better than through multilateralism; the persistence of
FTAs despite the success of the WTO must be traced at least partly to an
awareness of this reality.33 And, if this analysis has an element of truth to it, then
FTAs seriously damage the trade liberalization process by facilitating the
capture of it by extraneous demands that aim, not to reduce trade barriers, but to
increase them (as when market access is sought to be denied on grounds such
as "eco dumping" and "social dumping").
33
 See the discussion in my "Threats to the World Trading System: Income Distribution and
the Selfish Hegemon", Journal of International Affairs. 1994.
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To sum up, my view therefore is that the FT As, aside from being
preferential trading arrangements with the economic drawbacks I outlined
earlier, are a particularly damaging institutional arrangement to legitimate in the
world trading system. The time has surely come for international economists to
cut through the Orwellian newspeak, and the sloppy argumentation, of Free
Trade Areas and begin to think the unthinkable: should FT As really continue to
qualify under Article XXIV or should it be revised to apply only to groups of
countries aiming to create a Common Market ?34
34
 As far as I know, the archival research has not been done to tell us why both FTAs and CUs
were included in Article XXIV. I speculate on the original rationale of Article XXIV in The World
Trading System at Risk, op.cit.
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